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FOOTING THE BILL FOR NATURAL GAS 
LEAKS: WHY STATES SHOULD LIMIT 
COST RECOVERY OF LOST AND 
UNACCOUNTED FOR GAS 
Abstract: State statutes prohibit unjust or unreasonable natural gas utility 
rates. Public Utility Commissions (“PUCs”) administer these state laws and 
permit gas distribution companies to recover natural gas commodity costs re-
lated to lost and unaccounted for gas from customers through “purchased gas 
adjustment clauses.” In most of those states, PUCs permit "total recovery" of 
all lost and unaccounted for gas costs via these clauses using periodic rate ad-
justments. A small number of PUCs have reformed purchase gas adjustment 
clauses in order to incentivize gas distribution companies to reduce lost and 
unaccounted for gas. This Note advocates for all state public utility commis-
sions regulating natural gas distribution companies to reform purchased gas 
adjustment clause design in order to incentivize local gas distribution compa-
nies to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas. This Note also argues that the 
method used by the New York State Public Service Commission, limiting gas 
cost recovery to the historical average of actual lost gas, most closely aligns 
with the statutory purposes underlying laws that prohibit unjust and unreason-
able rates, while avoiding Constitutional takings concerns. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the winter of 2015, 69-year-old John Skelly froze to death in his 
home just outside of Detroit, Michigan.1 Prior to his death, the local natural 
gas utility company terminated his service because of an unpaid bill.2 Mr. 
Skelly’s death is just one incident highlighting the difficulties facing low-
income individuals in the United States, where the percentage of lower-
income households has increased from twenty-five percent of total house-
holds in 1971 to twenty-nine percent of total households in 2015.3 Many of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Katrease Stafford, State Asks: Why Did Hazel Park Veteran Freeze to Death?, DET. FREE 
PRESS (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2015/02/12/vietnam-
veteran-hypothermia-shutoff/23327507 [https://perma.cc/9H2G-MSWR]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS IS LOSING GROUND: NO LONGER 
THE MAJORITY AND FALLING BEHIND FINANCIALLY, at 8 (2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2015/12/2015-12-09_middle-class_FINAL-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVD9-F556]. The re-
port defines lower income households as those making less than sixty-seven percent of the median 
U.S. income. Id. at 6. Modern political dialogue in the United States increasingly addresses in-
come inequality as income and wealth have decreased for the working class while increasing sig-
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these lower-income consumers face difficulty paying their utility bills, with 
one study finding that sixty-nine percent of American adults who borrow 
using payday loans did so in order to cover a regular expense, like a utility 
bill.4 Meanwhile, state regulators allow natural gas distribution companies 
to charge consumers for billions of dollars in gas purchased by the company 
but lost before being sold to end-use consumers.5 For example, Massachu-
setts ratepayers alone paid at least $640 million between 2000 and 2011 for 
lost and unaccounted for gas.6 Gas lost through leaks also contributes to 
climate change and may pose public safety hazards.7 
This Note argues that state public utility commissions should regulate 
natural gas rates in a manner that provides the gas company with an incen-
tive to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas.8 It further argues that constitu-
tional constraints do not prohibit rate reforms providing this incentive.9 Part 
I explains lost and unaccounted for gas, provides a background on rate 
regulation of natural gas distribution companies, and discusses how the cost 
of lost and unaccounted for gas is recovered from ratepayers in the current 
regulatory scheme.10 Part II discusses how courts and state public utility 
commissions interpret statutory provisions requiring that natural gas rates 
be “just and reasonable” and non-confiscatory.11 Part III argues that the rate 
mechanisms that gas distribution companies use to recover lost and unac-
counted for gas from consumers in the majority of states should be re-
                                                                                                                           
nificantly for the wealthiest Americans. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, 
Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2015), https://georgetown
lawjournal.org/articles/164/antitrust-competition-policy-inequality/pdf [https://perma.cc/MT8D-
8TBP] (explaining wealth and income gaps). 
 4 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY 
BORROW, AND WHY, at 4–5 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_
assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/839T-U86E] (discussing reasons why 
borrowers use ultra-high interest payday loans). Payday loans are short-term loans for small amounts 
of money typically ranging from $100 to $500, for such high interest rates as 391%. Id. at 6. 
 5 See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE NAT. RES. COMM., AMERICA PAYS FOR GAS LEAKS: 
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE LEAKS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 7 (2013), http://www.markey.
senate.gov/documents/markey_lost_gas_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/55XR-XDJB] (presenting the 
amount of lost and unaccounted for gas, associated total cost, and cost per customer for Massa-
chusetts gas operators); see also ICF INT’L, LOST AND UNACCOUNTED FOR GAS 37 (2014), 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dpu/gas/icf-lauf-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LYE-5UZT] (dis-
cussing the impact of lost and unaccounted for gas on ratepayers). 
 6 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE NAT. RES. COMM., supra note 5, at 7. 
 7 See id. at 1 (summarizing global warming and public safety concerns); PA. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N, UNACCOUNTED-FOR-GAS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 11–12 (2012), 
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/transport/gassafe/pdf/UFG_Report_Feb2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TNN-
DRJU] (discussing greenhouse gas and public safety concerns regarding lost and unaccounted for 
gas). 
 8 See infra notes 168–183 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 14–105 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 106–164 and accompanying text. 
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formed in order to further the purposes of statutes requiring rates to be “just 
and reasonable.”12 Finally, Part III also argues that the Constitution does not 
pose a barrier to well-designed reforms.13 
I. RATE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY TREATMENT OF LOST AND 
UNACCOUNTED FOR GAS 
Lost and unaccounted for gas poses problems for consumers and society 
and causes gas distribution companies to incur associated cost.14 Only natural 
gas distribution companies may reduce lost and unaccounted for gas.15 State 
retail rate regulators, however, permit these companies to periodically adjust 
their retail rates in order to recover all of the cost of lost and unaccounted for 
gas.16 Section A describes lost and unaccounted for gas and outlines the asso-
ciated concerns over gas leaks and climate change.17 Section B provides a 
background on rate regulation of natural gas distribution companies.18 Final-
ly, Section C discusses how lost and unaccounted for gas is recovered from 
ratepayers within the current regulatory scheme.19 
A. Aging Infrastructure and Its Risks: Lost and Unaccounted for Gas and 
Public Policy Concerns Regarding Gas Leaks 
Lost and unaccounted for gas is defined as the difference between the to-
tal gas purchased by a gas distribution company and the quantity of gas it 
sells to customers or that it measured at customer meters.20 Numerous factors 
                                                                                                                           
12 See infra notes 168–183 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
 14 See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE NAT. RES. COMM., supra note 5, at 1 (summarizing the 
impact of gas leaks and other lost and unaccounted for natural gas on American consumers); see 
also PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public safety and climate 
change impacts of lost and unaccounted for gas). 
15 See Kenneth W. Costello, Lost and Unaccounted-for Gas: Challenges for Public Utility 
Regulators, 29 UTIL. POL’Y 17, 19 (2014) (noting that utility companies have some control over 
this issue). 
 16 See 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (2016) (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment fac-
tors in Massachusetts generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided by 
the total amount of sales made by the company to its customers); KEN COSTELLO, NAT’L REGU-
LATORY RESEARCH INST., LOST AND UNACCOUNTED-FOR GAS: PRACTICES OF STATE UTILITY 
COMMISSIONS 55–58 (2013) [hereinafter NRRI REPORT] (providing that nearly all of forty-one 
state public utility commissions responding to a 2013 survey acknowledged that the lost and unac-
counted for gas costs under their jurisdiction flowed through their purchased gas adjustment clauses). 
 17 See infra notes 20–48 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 50–72 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 73–105 and accompanying text. 
 20 ICF INT’L, supra note 5, at 1; Costello, supra note 15, at 17–18. Lost and unaccounted for 
gas is made up of two components: (1) lost gas, or gas that finds its way out of the distribution sys-
tem between the point where it enters the company’s system and the point where it reaches a custom-
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may contribute to lost and unaccounted for gas.21 Gas distribution companies 
have the power to exercise some amount of control over the causes of lost and 
unaccounted for gas, such as repairing leaks or ensuring that meters are as 
accurate as possible.22 
Gas leaks and lost and unaccounted for gas have recently gained the at-
tention of legislators, environmental advocates, and newspaper reporters.23 In 
2014, Connecticut Governor Dan Malloy signed into law a statute requiring 
the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (“PURA”) to provide 
an annual report to the Connecticut Legislature including information about 
the percentage of lost and unaccounted for gas by regulated gas distribution 
companies and information about the number of leaks and their causes on 
each distribution company system.24 
                                                                                                                           
er’s meter, and (2) unaccounted for gas that does not escape the distribution system but is not meas-
ured by a customer’s meter. Costello, supra note 15, at 18. The natural gas industry is divided into 
three separate segments: (1) producers that pump natural gas from original underground sources; 
(2) transporters that bring gas by pipe or otherwise from those points of production to distribution 
companies; and (3) distributors, or distribution companies, that use pipelines to carry gas to end 
users. 1-1 WILLIAM A. MOGEL, REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUSTRY § 1.01 (2016).  
 21 See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF WHITE PAPER ON LOST AND UNACCOUNTED FOR 
(LAUF) GAS 16–21, http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%
7B0413ECDD-C194-46DE-8B04-AFDB3FBBE404%7D [https://perma.cc/VSJ8-QVP6] (noting 
causes such as meter issues and error, meter reading issues, therm billing, leaks, and theft of ser-
vice). Most of these causes can be broken down into gas that is lost, usually through leaks, or gas that 
is otherwise unaccounted for because of issues with metering equipment, theft of service, or other 
causes. Id. 
 22 See Costello, supra note 15, at 19 (noting the different ways gas distribution companies can 
affect this change). 
 23 See, e.g., H.B. 4164, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2014) (setting forth mandatory repair time-
lines for leaks and reporting requirements for lost and unaccounted for gas and leaks); H.B. 5410, 
Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2014) (requiring similar reporting requirements for gas distribu-
tion companies); SHANNA CLEVELAND, CONSERVATION LAW FOUND., INTO THIN AIR: HOW 
LEAKING GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IS HARMING OUR ENVIRONMENT AND WASTING A VALUABLE 
RESOURCE, at 1, 16 (2012), http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CSF_
fugitive_emissions_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BKD-6DEL] (advocating for limiting cost recovery 
for lost and unaccounted for gas); DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE NAT. RES. COMM., supra note 5, 
at 1 (reporting the impact of gas leaks and other lost and unaccounted for gas on American consum-
ers); David Abel, Project Reveals 20,000 Leaks in Mass. Gas Lines, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/20/new-law-casts-light-state-natural-gas-leaks/qJJP
CjRZITc5ai0JeHNOqO/story.html [https://perma.cc/P5A3-GFX5] (elaborating on the extent of 
gas leaks in Massachusetts). 
 24 See Conn. H.B. 5410 (providing reporting requirements for lost and unaccounted for gas 
and leaks). In 2014, PURA initiated an administrative proceeding to form the basis of an administra-
tive record for the first report that was issued in April 2015. See CONN. PUB. UTILS. REGULATORY 
AUTH., PURA REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING LOST AND UNACCOUNTED 
FOR GAS, No. 14-07-16, at 1 (Apr. 29, 2015), 2015 WL 3509388. PURA reported that the five-year 
average lost and unaccounted for gas figures for Connecticut natural gas distribution companies 
ranged from 0.84% to 1.54%. Id. at 2. The figures are derived from PURA administrative interrog-
atories that the regulated companies answered. Id. 
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Also in 2014, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed into law a 
statute codifying a uniform classification system of natural gas distribution 
company system leaks based on the public safety threat of the leak.25 The 
statute requires gas distribution companies to annually report to the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Utilities (“DPU”) the location and repair dates 
of every leak on the system.26 Furthermore, the statute requires the DPU to 
provide the Legislature with an annual report on gas leaks in the natural gas 
system.27 DPU’s report on calendar year 2014’s leak information found that 
the gas distribution companies and municipal gas system operators reported a 
total of 40,425 leaks.28 At the end of 2014, there were 20,733 unrepaired 
leaks still on the system.29 
Additionally, in 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Pro-
tecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (“PIPES”) Act.30 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Mass. H.B. 4164 (setting forth mandatory repair timelines for leaks and reporting re-
quirements for lost and unaccounted for gas and leaks); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, 
§ 144 (West 2016) (setting forth the uniform gas leak classification system in the Massachusetts 
statutory code). Leaks are classified as Grade 1, 2, or 3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 144. 
Grade 1 leaks pose immediate threats to public safety and require immediate repair. See id. (stating 
the same). Grade 2 leaks are not immediately hazardous but must be repaired within a reasonable 
timeframe to prevent future public safety threats. Id. Under the Massachusetts statute, Grade 2 leaks 
must be repaired within twelve months of the date that the leak was detected, and a gas distribu-
tion company must reevaluate the leak within six months of when it was detected. Id. Grade 3 
leaks are not hazardous and expected to remain nonhazardous. Id. A Grade 3 leak is not required to 
be repaired as long as the leak remains non-hazardous, but the gas distribution company must 
reevaluate the leak at least once annually. Id. 
 26 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 144(e). 
 27 See Mass. H.B. 4164 (setting forth mandatory repair timelines for leaks and reporting re-
quirements for lost and unaccounted for gas and leaks). 
 28 MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE PREVALENCE OF 
NATURAL GAS LEAKS IN THE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM, 15-GLR-01, at 27 (Sept. 18, 2015). The 
40,425 leaks reported are broken down into 9,855 Grade 1 leaks, 9,039 Grade 2 leaks, and 21,713 
Grade 3 leaks. Id. 
 29 Id. These 20,773 leaks are broken down into 86 Grade 1 leaks, 1,230 Grade 2 leaks, and 
19,459 Grade 3 leaks. Id. The report estimated that this represents 1,658,102 Mcf of lost gas due 
to leakage and 40,470.82 MT of methane emissions in 2014.Id. The reason that these two numbers 
differ is that many leaks, especially those that are most dangerous, are repaired as they are discov-
ered. Id. at 27–28. The Connecticut report also analyzed the number of gas leaks throughout Con-
necticut. CONN. PUB. UTILS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 24, at 8–10. Prior to mandatory 
detailed leak reporting requirements, some independent researchers used equipment to survey 
methane leaks in the streets of major cities and published their findings. See Robert B. Jackson et 
al., Natural Gas Pipeline Leaks Across Washington, DC, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2051, 2051–58 
(2014) (identifying and mapping locations and intensity of 5,893 leaks over 1,500 measured road 
miles of Washington, D.C., by driving the streets and collecting data using sensory equipment); 
Nathan G. Phillips et al., Mapping Urban Pipeline Leaks: Methane Leaks Across Boston, 173 
ENVTL. POLLUTION 1, 1–4 (2013) (identifying and mapping locations and intensity of 3,356 me-
thane leaks in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, by driving the streets and collecting data using 
sensory equipment). 
30 PIPES Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, 130 Stat. 514. The Pipeline and Hazardous Mate-
rials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) is responsible for regulating pipelines and their operators 
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The PIPES Act contains a provision requiring the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) to review state policies encour-
aging natural gas distribution companies to repair or replace pipelines with 
leaks, including leak repair timelines and limits on cost recovery from rate-
payers.31 After reviewing state policies, PHMSA must issue a report to Con-
gress that must include recommendations on federal or state policies based on 
its policy review.32 The PIPES Act authorized PHMSA to implement regula-
tions based on the recommendations that it includes in its report.33 
Gas lost through leaks poses environmental policy concerns because of 
its potential climate change impact.34 Gas that leaks out of pipes is primarily 
methane gas, a potent greenhouse gas.35 Although methane’s lifetime in the 
atmosphere is much shorter than carbon dioxide, methane is significantly 
more efficient at trapping heat than carbon dioxide.36 The impact of methane 
on climate change is more than twenty-five times greater than carbon dioxide 
over a one hundred year period, pound for pound.37 One report prepared for 
U.S. Senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts noted that gas distribution 
companies released 69 billion cubic feet of natural gas into the atmosphere in 
2011, which matches the yearly gas needs of the state of Maine or the carbon 
dioxide emissions of six million automobiles.38 
                                                                                                                           
to ensure their safety and security. See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–60141 (2016). According to 
the Senate Committee report, the primary purpose of the PIPES Act is to reauthorize various pipe-
line safety programs administered by PHMSA. S. REP. NO. 114-209, at 1 (2016). 
31 PIPES Act of 2016 § 30(a). 
32 Id. § 30(b). 
33 Id. § 30(c). The Act contains additional provisions requiring PHMSA to study the metrics 
used in calculating lost and unaccounted for gas. Id. § 29. PHMSA must analyze discrepancies in 
lost and unaccounted for gas reporting standards, analyze whether alternatives could improve lost 
and unaccounted for gas reporting, describe potential safety issues associated with lost and unac-
counted for gas, and assess whether alternative reporting and metrics may increase safety and 
provide ratepayer savings. Id. § 29(b). The Act also authorizes PHMSA to promulgate regulations 
that implement any improved lost and unaccounted for gas reporting metrics recommended as part 
of its study. Id. § 29(c). 
 34 See CLEVELAND, supra note 23, at 12 (describing how gas leaks have climate change im-
plications). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 34 (2014) (comparing methane to carbon dioxide); Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html [https://perma.cc/4ZFF-6HHH] 
(noting differences between methane and carbon dioxide); see also Nat’l Ctrs. for Envtl. Info., 
Greenhouse Gases, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
monitoring-references/faq/greenhouse-gases.php [https://perma.cc/NT5D-BBKR] (discussing me-
thane’s ability to absorb heat). 
 37 See Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 36 
 38 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE NAT. RES. COMM., supra note 5, at 1. In addition to its 
climate change impacts as a greenhouse gas, methane is a volatile organic compound that reacts 
with nitrogen oxide in the atmosphere in order to create tropospheric ozone that adversely effects 
human health, increasing chronic respiratory and cardiovascular conditions, and is associated with 
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In addition to environmental and consumer concerns, gas leaks have 
drawn public attention for public safety reasons, especially since a large gas 
explosion in San Bruno, California.39 In September 2010, a Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company-owned large-diameter natural gas transmission pipeline 
ruptured in San Bruno, California.40 Fire and explosion resulted from the gas 
that escaped from the pipeline, causing eight deaths, fifty-eight injuries, thir-
ty-eight destroyed homes, and seventy damaged homes.41  
In 2012, the Pennsylvania PUC staff issued a report advocating a regula-
tory approach for lost and unaccounted for gas, associating lost and unac-
counted for gas with leaks.42 Although lost gas typically escapes to the at-
mosphere without causing a threat, gas lost through leaks may migrate under-
ground and concentrate in dangerous levels.43 The report correlates leaks with 
                                                                                                                           
higher likelihood of premature mortalities. J. Jason West et al., Global Health Benefits of Mitigat-
ing Ozone Pollution with Methane Emission Controls, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3988, 3988–
93 (2006). 
 39 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CONSUMER PROTECTION & SAFETY DIVISION, INCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION REPORT: SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 PG&E PIPELINE RUPTURE IN SAN BRUNO, CALI-
FORNIA, 1 (Jan 12, 2012), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/
Safety/Natural_Gas_Pipeline/News/AgendaStaffReportreOIIPGESanBrunoExplosion.pdf; Letter 
from Stephen F. Lynch, Congressman, 8th District, Massachusetts, to Norman C. Bay, Chairman, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Nov. 2, 2016), http://lynch.house.gov/sites/lynch.house.
gov/files/SFL%20Letter%20to%20FERC%20Chairman%20Bay%2C%20November%202%2C%
202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PPR-TBDH] (urging FERC Chair to delay permitting and construc-
tion of certain gas pipeline projects in light of an Alabama pipeline explosion); Press Release, 
United States Congressman Stephen Lynch, Lynch Calls on FERC to Halt Pipeline Projects in 
West Roxbury and Weymouth Following Pipeline Explosions (Nov. 2, 2016), https://lynch.house.
gov/press-release/lynch-calls-ferc-halt-pipeline-projects-west-roxbury-and-weymouth-following-
pipeline [https://perma.cc/TM4A-JCH4] (noting that Lynch asked FERC to halt permitting of certain 
pipeline projects because of the explosion and another gas leak incident); Rebecca Bowe & Lisa 
Pickoff-White, Five Years After Deadly San Bruno Explosion: Are We Safer?, KQED NEWS (Sept. 
8, 2015), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/09/08/five-years-after-deadly-san-bruno-explosion-are-
we-safer/ [https://perma.cc/RJJ9-ZGPA] (discussing efforts to find leaks in pipes to prevent acci-
dents after the San Bruno explosion). See generally Pipeline Safety Since San Bruno and Other 
Incidents: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Surface Transp. and Merch. Marine Infrastructure, 
Safety, and Sec. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 112th Cong. (2011) (discussing 
efforts at addressing public safety in pipelines since the San Bruno incident and efforts to address 
gas leaks). 
 40 CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 39, at 1. 
 41 Id. Although the San Bruno incident resulted from a leak on a transmission pipeline, this 
Note focuses on regulation of natural gas distribution pipelines that generally are smaller in di-
ameter and therefore less likely for a leak or incident to result in the same quantity of damage as 
the San Bruno incident. See Pipeline Safety: Public Meeting on Integrity Management of Gas 
Distribution Pipelines, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,438, 50,439 (Aug. 26, 2005) (explaining differences be-
tween transmission and distribution gas pipeline systems). 
 42 See PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11, 13–14 (discussing safety issues that may 
exist when a gas system operates with high levels of lost and unaccounted for gas and recom-
mending regulatory action to limit lost and unaccounted for gas recovery). The report noted that 
high percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas might pose a safety threat. Id. at 11. 
 43 Id. at 11. 
324 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:317 
lost and unaccounted for gas and concludes that reducing leaks would reduce 
lost and unaccounted for gas.44 
Since the San Bruno explosion, gas leaks have been responsible for oth-
er tragedies.45 On January 18, 2011, natural gas migrating from a ruptured 
pipe in Philadelphia entered the basement of a nearby property where it en-
countered an ignition source.46 Police had received a call reporting a strong 
gas odor earlier in the evening, and numerous Philadelphia Gas Works em-
ployees were on site responding when the explosion occurred.47 One of these 
employees was killed and five others were injured.48 In 2013, the Pennsylva-
nia PUC approved a settlement between Philadelphia Gas Works and Com-
mission investigators that required the natural gas distribution company to 
pay a $500,000 fine as a result of this gas leak-related explosion.49 
B. Overview of Natural Gas Distribution Company Rate Regulation and the 
Rise of the Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause 
The natural gas industry is divided into three separate segments: (1) 
producers that pump natural gas from original underground sources; (2) 
transporters that bring gas by pipe or otherwise from those points of produc-
tion to distribution companies; and (3) distributors, or distribution compa-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 See, e.g., Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Phila. Gas Works, C-2011-2278312, slip op. at 12 (Pa. 
P.U.C. July 16, 2013) (describing a Philadelphia explosion caused by a natural gas leak). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. The explosion destroyed a building that contained two apartments and a chiropractor’s 
office. Id. Some surrounding properties and vehicles were also damaged. Id. Punctured gas distribu-
tion lines can also cause dangerous gas leaks. E.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS. PIPELINE ENG’G & 
SAFETY DIV., INCIDENT REPORT 13 (2014), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dpu/pipeline/incident-
reports/9-18-14-springfield.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DKN-BRM2]. For further illustration, in No-
vember 2012, the gas distribution company in Springfield, Massachusetts received a phone call from 
a property manager reporting a gas odor. Id. at 4. A worker in the building claimed that she had 
smelled gas inside the building for four months. Derek Anderson et al., Gas Explosion Levels 
Springfield Strip Club, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 24, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/
11/24/springfield-explosion-injures-least-levels-strip-club/SX7MmBHvdfePUBkpyCgG6L/story.
html [https://perma.cc/EKB4-TUSC]. The company employee who came to investigate the call 
punctured the gas service line when he attempted to conduct a test of the service. MASS. DEP’T OF 
PUB. UTILS. PIPELINE ENG’G AND SAFETY DIV., supra note 48, at 13. Although numerous steps 
were taken to deal with the ensuing leak, slightly over an hour later, the building exploded, injuring 
numerous people. See id. at 8, 13 (reporting that the incident injured seventeen people). At the 
time, one newspaper article reported that the incident caused eighteen injuries. Anderson et al., 
supra note 48. 
 49 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, C-2011-2278312, slip op. at 30–32. Philadelphia Gas Works is 
owned by the City of Philadelphia and is not a privately owned gas distribution company. Id. at 
22. 
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nies, that use local pipelines to carry gas to end-users.50 The Natural Gas 
Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to 
regulate the rates charged for the transportation of natural gas and associat-
ed terms and conditions of service by certain gas companies subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.51 FERC’s jurisdiction is limited to (1) “the 
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,” (2) “the sale in inter-
state commerce of natural gas for resale,” and (3) “natural-gas companies 
engaged in such transportation or sale . . . .”52 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Natural Gas Act in a manner that provides states with exclu-
sive regulatory jurisdiction over intrastate commercial gas activity and local 
distribution.53 
For much of the Twentieth Century, state public utility commissions 
fixed a single rate that local gas distribution companies could charge their 
retail customers.54 This rate was designed to recover the costs of the com-
pany’s capital investments in the distribution infrastructure, the prudent op-
erating costs of running the company, a reasonable profit, and the wholesale 
costs of the gas purchased to serve customers.55 Therefore, if the wholesale 
price of gas changed, a local distribution company had to apply to the pub-
lic utility commission for an increase or decrease in the general rate it 
charged its customers and potentially undergo a lengthy investigation of all 
of the company’s other costs before the change could take effect.56 Regula-
tory lag is a product of the process just described.57 It is the interval be-
tween changes in costs and corresponding changes in rates after review and 
                                                                                                                           
 50 MOGEL, supra note 20. In this section, this Note discusses distributor or distribution com-
pany-purchased gas adjustment clauses, not for producers or transporters. See infra notes 54–72 
and accompanying text (discussing distribution company-purchased gas adjustment clauses). 
 51 See 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1938) (stating the same); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1591, 1596 (2015) (summarizing FERC’s jurisdiction over natural gas companies under the Natu-
ral Gas Act). 
 52 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2005); Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1596 (quoting § 717(b) and interpreting the 
provision as a limit on jurisdiction). 
 53 See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 507 
(1989) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) and noting the extent of state jurisdiction). According to the 
Natural Gas Act, federal jurisdiction does not extend “to the local distribution of natural gas or to 
the facilities used for such distribution . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 717(b). 
 54 See, e.g., State ex rel. Midwest Gas Users’ Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the State of 
Mo., 976 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the history of the recovery of costs 
associated with wholesale gas from the customers of local gas distribution companies in Mis-
souri). 
 55 See id. (explaining how, until the early 1960s, a single retail rate recovered all of the local gas 
distribution company’s costs from its customers, including the cost of wholesale gas purchases). 
 56 See id. (discussing the history of the recovery of costs associated with wholesale gas from 
the customers of local gas distribution companies). 
57 See Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natu-
ral Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 360 (1983) (describing regulatory lag). 
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approval by a PUC.58 Regulatory lag encourages utilities to keep costs 
down because, even though costs have increased, the company’s rates can-
not be increased until the state completes the associated review and ap-
proves the changes.59 
In the mid-Twentieth Century, state PUCs, such as the New York Pub-
lic Service Commission, began to authorize local gas distribution compa-
nies to maintain purchased gas adjustment clauses as part of the rates the 
Commission approved.60 These provisions permitted companies to raise or 
lower the portion of the rates reflecting the cost of purchased gas without 
requiring the filing or approval of new rate schedules.61 The Commission 
would allow the adjustment directly tied to an increase or decrease of the 
natural gas commodity costs contracted for or purchased by the company.62 
That purchased gas is a cost beyond control of the company or the 
state was a key factor for a PUC initially permitting purchased gas adjust-
ment clauses.63 The cost of purchased gas is generally beyond control of the 
company or the state because market forces outside the control of the com-
pany largely drive cost.64 Therefore, the regulatory lag benefits that may be 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. et al., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 271, 307 (N.Y. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n 1953) (approving a purchased gas adjustment clause). 
 61 See id. at 277 (describing the purchased gas adjustment clause proposed in the proceeding); 
Joe H. Foy, Cost Adjustment in Utility Rate Cases, 13 VAND. L. REV. 663, 663 (1960) (describing 
adjustment clauses generally). 
 62 Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) at 277 (describing the adjustment 
clauses applied for and approved as applying to costs outside of the companies’ control). The New 
York State Public Service Commission, for example, first authorized local gas distribution com-
panies to maintain a “purchased gas adjustment” in 1953. Id. at 307. 
63 See e.g., id. at 291–92 (expressing concern regarding each company’s ability to absorb a 
twenty percent increase in gas commodity cost that is outside of each company’s control). In 
1953, in Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., the New York distribution companies asked the Public Ser-
vice Commission for an adjustment clause because they were concerned about the twenty percent 
increase in the price of gas that they purchased from their supplier, conditionally approved by the 
Federal Power Commission. Id. at 274–75. The New York distribution companies would have had 
to purchase gas from their supplier at the price approved by the Federal Power Commission, but 
their retail rates were set by the state. See id. (describing a proceeding occurring before the Federal 
Power Commission where a supplier’s rate increase was being considered); see also Nantahala 
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986) (holding that once a federal rate regu-
lator sets a supplier’s rate, a state retail rate regulator may not exercise its authority to prevent the 
retail company from passing the federally approved supply costs along to retail consumers). 
64 See In re Bay State Gas Co., D.T.E. 01-09 et seq., 3 (Jan. 31, 2001) (Mass. Dep’t of Tele-
comm. and Energy) (explaining how gas commodity prices are determined and summarizing the 
history of federal regulation and deregulation of gas producer prices); Marshall A. Leaffer, Auto-
matic Fuel Adjustment Clauses: Time for a Hearing, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 228, 236 (1980) 
(noting that the intent of adjustment clauses are to pass along costs beyond a regulated utility 
company’s control). But see Leaffer, supra note, at 234 (arguing that fuel adjustment clauses for 
vertically integrated electric companies reduce incentive for companies to procure the lowest cost 
fuel supply). 
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achieved by limiting the company’s ability to increase prices to reflect these 
costs are limited.65 
Most state PUCs originally refused to allow electric or gas companies 
to adopt fuel adjustment clauses like New York’s purchased gas adjustment 
clause.66 By the late 1950s, however, rapid changes in natural gas com-
modity prices accelerated state PUCs’ acceptance of gas adjustment claus-
es.67 Purchased gas adjustment clauses are currently permitted in every state 
in the United States.68 These clauses reflect real-time information regarding 
natural gas supply, encouraging consumers to conserve in times of shortage 
and allowing them, not the company, to reap benefits when gas supply costs 
fall.69 Without gas adjustment clauses, utility companies would be forced to 
                                                                                                                           
65 See In re Bay State Gas Co., supra note 64 (explaining the derivation of gas commodity 
prices); Pierce, supra note 57, at 360 (describing regulatory lag). 
 66 Foy, supra note 61, at 663. Commissions offered numerous reasons for denying these ad-
justment clauses, including a concern that the clause would reduce the incentive of utility man-
agement to make sure that fuel is inexpensively purchased . Id. at 664. By 1917, however, Illinois 
and New Hampshire permitted coal adjustment clauses in the rate schedules of electricity compa-
nies. Id. 
 67 Id. at 665. Before the Second World War, companies supplying customers with gas for 
heating or cooking fuel in the populous northeast used manufactured gas. MOGEL, supra note 20, 
§ 1.07. Manufactured gas is similar to natural gas, but instead of being pumped from wells, it can 
be made at any location from coal, oil, wood, or other organic material. Alexandra B. Klass, The 
Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1895, 1903–04 (2015). Natural gas offered numerous benefits over manufactured gas, 
such as being a more efficient and environmentally friendly gas. Id. at 1904–05. During the Sec-
ond World War, the United States built long-distance pipelines between the southeast United 
States and the northeast United States to transport natural gas, permitting widespread distribution 
of that commodity instead of manufactured gas over local gas distribution systems. Foy, supra 
note 61, at 665. In 1948, these long-distance pipelines allowed Philadelphia to become the first 
major eastern city to convert from manufactured gas to natural gas. Klass, supra note, at 1907. 
Between 1950 and 1956, many long-distance interstate pipelines permitted the movement of cheap 
natural gas from the Southeast to the Northeast. Id. As demand grew outside the Southwest, how-
ever, supply did not keep pace, triggering frequent price increases in the commodity cost of natu-
ral gas entering local gas distribution systems for sale to retail customers. Foy, supra note 61, at 
665–66. The weighted average price paid to producers for gas purchased in the field by ten major 
pipeline companies increased from 4.16 cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas in 1948 to 
11.92 cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas in 1957. Id. at 666. 
 68 Purchased Gas Adjustments, AM. GAS ASS’N, https://www.aga.org/purchased-gas-
adjustments [https://perma.cc/5REQ-7E86]. 
69 See, e.g., 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (2016) (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment 
factors in Massachusetts generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided 
by the total amount of sales made by the company to its customers); The Provision of Basic Gas 
Supply Service Pursuant to the Electric Discount and Energy Competition Act, N.J.S.A. 48:3-49, 
No. GX01050304 (N.J. Bd. of Regulatory Comm’rs) (Jan. 6, 2003) (explaining the basis of rate 
adjustments under the Basic Gas Supply Service); Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. 
(PUR) at 297–300 (describing approved cost adjustment factors and factor of adjustment applied); 
Leaffer, supra note 64, at 239–40 (describing generally fuel adjustment clause formulas in all 
states for vertically integrated electric companies); Foy, supra note 61, at 663 (describing adjust-
ment clauses generally). 
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continue to repeatedly apply for comprehensive rate increases, with the 
formal hearings, trial-type processes, and delays associated therewith.70 
Rate proceedings are long, resource-intensive, and expensive adjudicatory 
proceedings.71 When changes to a rate can be tied directly to changes in a 
discrete operating expense, adjustment clauses may be appropriate regulato-
ry policy in order to ensure adherence to the statutory mandate of just and 
reasonable rates.72  
C. Rate Recovery of Lost and Unaccounted for Gas 
Most states allow for utilities to recover all costs of lost and unaccounted 
for gas from customers under their gas adjustment clause mechanisms, 
whereas two states have adopted alternative approaches.73 Subsection 1 of 
this section reviews the total recovery approach that occurs in the majority of 
states.74 Subsection 2 then reviews the alternative steps New York has taken 
to limit natural gas distribution companies’ cost recovery for lost and unac-
counted for gas, hereafter called the historical averaging approach.75 Finally, 
Subsection 3 reviews a command and control style approach to capping lost 
and unaccounted for gas recovery.76 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Foy, supra note 61, at 663 (stating the same and discussing factors that can contribute 
to complexity in rate proceedings). 
 71 See id. (arguing that cost adjustment mechanisms in utility rates are beneficial and in the 
public interest because they simplify the ratemaking process and cost). 
 72 See id. at 663, 674. Generally, state statutes require gas distribution company rates to be 
“just and reasonable.” See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.030 (West 2009) (requiring “just and 
reasonable” rates); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2016) (authorizing the New York Pub-
lic Service Commission to set “just and reasonable prices”); 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1308(c) (West 1984) (providing the public utility commission with the authority to set “just and 
reasonable” utility company rates); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(a) (West 2016) (providing the 
West Virginia Public Utility Commission authority to “fix reasonable rates”); Bay State Gas Co. 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 947 N.E.2d 1077, 1085 (Mass. 2011) (interpreting Massachusetts statute 
requiring the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities to investigate the propriety of gas dis-
tribution company’s rate increase to require said Department to find that the rates are “just and 
reasonable”). 
 73 See NRRI REPORT, supra note 16, at 55–58 (providing that nearly all of forty-one state 
public utility commissions responding to a 2013 survey acknowledged that the lost and unac-
counted for gas costs under their jurisdiction flowed through the purchased gas adjustment claus-
es); see also 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (2016) (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment 
factors in Massachusetts generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided 
by the total amount of sales made by the company to its customers). 
 74 See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 97–105 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Total Recovery Approach 
In most states, PUCs approve gas adjustment clause formulas designed 
to adjust local gas distribution company retail rates semi-annually to pass 
along the cost of all lost and unaccounted for gas to the company’s retail cus-
tomers.77 Most gas adjustment clauses utilize formulas that the PUCs have 
approved or set forth.78 These formulas provide that a company may recover 
the total cost of the gas purchased by the company through sales to custom-
ers.79 If, for example, a company purchased 120 units of gas for $120 and 
sold only 100 units to customers, it would charge each customer $1.20 per 
unit of gas, whereby 20 cents of such charge would reflect recovery of the 
cost of lost and unaccounted for gas.80 These formulas permit a company to 
adjust its rates multiple times throughout the year, ensuring that all of the 
costs associated with the company’s gas purchases are recovered from cus-
tomers.81 Therefore, using purchased gas adjustment clauses, companies re-
cover not just the cost of the gas that they sold to retail customers but also all 
of its lost and unaccounted for gas.82 Nearly all of forty-one state PUCs re-
sponding to a 2013 survey acknowledged that the lost and unaccounted for 
gas costs for natural gas distribution companies under their jurisdiction 
flowed through their purchased gas adjustment clauses.83 An overwhelming 
number of those commissions responded to the survey acknowledging that 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See, e.g., 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors 
in Massachusetts generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided by the 
total amount of sales made by the company to its customers). For example, under the Massachu-
setts adjustment clause regulations, the company’s rates charged to customers are adjusted biannually 
to recover the cost of purchased gas from its customers. See id. (setting forth the purchased gas ad-
justment clause formula to be used in Massachusetts). Lost and unaccounted for gas is defined as the 
difference between the total gas purchased by a gas distribution company and the quantity of gas 
measured at customer meters representing the gas that is lost through leaks. ICF INT’L, supra note 5, 
at 1-1; Costello, supra note 15, at 17–18. 
 78 See, e.g., 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors 
in Massachusetts generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided by the 
total amount of sales made by the company to its customers); The Provision of Basic Gas Supply 
Service, supra note 69 (explaining the basis of rate adjustments under the Basic Gas Supply Ser-
vice); Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) at 297–300 (describing approved 
cost adjustment factors and factor of adjustment applied); Leaffer, supra note 64, at 239–40 (de-
scribing generally fuel adjustment clause formulas in all states for vertically integrated electric 
companies). 
 79 See 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (Massachusetts’s purchased gas adjustment clause formu-
la). 
 80 See id. (Massachusetts’s purchased gas adjustment clause formula). 
 81 See id. (noting that the purchased gas adjustment formula is applied to adjust gas rates 
semi-annually). 
 82 See id. (Massachusetts’s purchased gas adjustment clause formula). 
 83 See NRRI REPORT, supra note 16, at 55–58 (providing the results of a survey of all state 
commissions on the matter). 
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their jurisdictional companies had no incentive to reduce lost and unaccount-
ed for gas.84 
2. The Historical Averaging Approach 
Before 1990, New York followed the majority’s Total Recovery Ap-
proach allowing local gas distribution companies to recover the entire amount 
that they spent on gas from their customers through gas adjustment clauses, 
regardless of the amount of gas that was lost and unaccounted for.85 New 
York gas distribution companies calculated their purchased gas adjustment 
clauses billed to each customer by dividing the total gas purchased by the 
company by the amount sold to consumers.86 In 1990, the New York Public 
Service Commission approved modifications to its regulations regarding gas 
cost adjustment clauses.87 The new regulations included a factor of adjust-
ment for New York Gas Cost Adjustment Clauses to account for lost and un-
accounted for gas.88 This provision incentivizes local gas distribution compa-
nies to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas.89 
After implementing the historical averaging approach in 1990, the per-
centage of lost or unaccounted for gas that can be recovered from customers 
is a fixed percentage of gas sales.90 If actual lost and unaccounted for gas is 
greater than the amount allowed by the factor of adjustment, therefore, a 
company must absorb the cost.91 If a company’s actual lost and unaccounted 
for gas is less than the amount it is allowed to recover from customers by the 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. at 58–62 (providing the responses of forty-one state commissions). 
 85 N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 5. 
 86 See, e.g., Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) at 281–82 (describing the 
purchased gas adjustment formula approved by the Commission); see also 220 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors in Massachusetts as similar to 
those factors that existed in New York prior to the 1990 modifications). In other words, if the com-
pany purchased 120 units of gas for $120 and sold 100 units to customers, it would charge each cus-
tomer $1.20 per unit of gas, whereby 20 cents for each unit of gas paid for by customers recover gas 
that has been lost and unaccounted for. See, e.g., Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 Pub. Util. Rep. 
(PUR) at 281–82 (describing the purchased gas adjustment formula approved by the Commis-
sion); see also 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors 
in Massachusetts as similar to that that existed in New York prior to the 1990 modifications). 
 87 N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, Resolution by the Commission, Case 21,656, Proceeding on 
Motion of the Commission as to Rules Governing the Construction and Filing of Schedules and 
Contracts Relating to Rates and Service of Electric, Gas, Steam, Telegraph, Telephone, and Wa-
ter-Works Corporations and Municipalities 1 (Sept. 18, 1990). 
 88 Id. at 8. 
 89 N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6. 
 90 Id. This can be contrasted with other states where all lost and unaccounted for gas cost is 
recovered from customers regardless of the quantity of lost and unaccounted for gas. See, e.g., 220 
MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors in Massachusetts 
generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company divided by the total amount of 
sales made by the company to its customers). 
 91 N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6. 
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factor of adjustment, the company would retain the additional revenue.92 
Generally, New York has set the factor of adjustment based on the historical 
average of actual multi-year average lost and unaccounted for gas during the 
time in which the company’s rates were examined as part of a full rate pro-
ceeding.93 This method has successfully lowered lost and unaccounted for gas 
and the associated impact on ratepayers.94 The result has been lesser amounts 
of lost and unaccounted for gas since the historical averaging approach was 
adopted, and a correspondingly lower factor of adjustment, because the com-
pany sees immediate rewards for plugging leaks and fixing meters.95 The 
New York Department of Public Service has translated this reduction in lost 
and unaccounted for gas into an annual gas savings of $48 million for con-
sumers in the state.96 
3. The Command and Control Approach 
Pennsylvania also restricts the amount of lost and unaccounted for gas 
that gas distribution companies may recover from their ratepayers within a 
gas adjustment clause.97 In February 2012, the Pennsylvania PUC issued a 
report studying lost and unaccounted for gas in Pennsylvania and recom-
mending that the Commission set target levels of lost and unaccounted for gas 
or metrics for distribution system losses.98 Unlike the historical averaging 
approach, the command and control approach establishes annual targets for 
percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas that decrease until reaching three 
percent, where it remains for subsequent years.99 The regulation provides that 
each gas distribution company, beginning with the first gas adjustment clause 
filing after August 11, 2014, may only recover a prescribed amount according 
to a table.100 In the first year under this table, only five percent of lost and 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 6–7. 
 94 See id. at 6 (describing how the historical averaging approach saved New York gas con-
sumers millions of dollars); see also CLEVELAND, supra note 23, at 16 (noting a lower amount of 
lost gas in New York as compared to Massachusetts). 
 95 See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6 (noting how New York’s historical 
averaging approach incentivizes companies to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas and has result-
ed in consumers paying less through the purchased gas adjustment clause). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c) (2013) (requiring each natural gas distribution company to 
reduce lost and unaccounted for gas beginning after August 11, 2014). 
 98 PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 13–14. The report noted the public safety benefits 
and climate change benefits as two reasons for instituting the changes. Id. at 11–12. 
 99 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c). In the final rulemaking order establishing the regulations, the 
Commission established rebuttable command and control capped recovery approach citing as statuto-
ry authority its duty to ensure “just and reasonable” rates. PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PA. BULL NO. 32, 
ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM DEFINITION AND METRICS FOR UNACCOUNTED-FOR GAS 4586 (2013), 
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol43/43-32/43_32_rr.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5E-XXCA]. 
100 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c). 
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unaccounted for gas may be recovered from ratepayers.101 This permitted 
percentage drops by half a percent each year until reaching three percent in 
year five.102 The targets are rebuttable; the company can recover a greater 
amount of lost or unaccounted for gas costs if it can demonstrate good cause 
to the Commission to overcome the presumptive limitation.103 
In 2015, Massachusetts legislators introduced a bill that would more ag-
gressively limit natural gas distribution companies from recovering the cost 
of lost and unaccounted for gas above certain designated maximum amounts, 
similar to the command and control approach.104 The bill would limit the 
amount of lost and unaccounted for gas costs that companies may recover 
from ratepayers to one percent for distribution system volumes in the first 
year after the bill’s passage, and such limit would decrease each year until 
reaching zero six years after the bill’s passage.105 
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
States commissions regulate gas distribution companies as public utili-
ties with relative uniformity.106 These commissions regulate the rates these 
companies charge their retail customers, and generally, state statutes require 
that rates be “just and reasonable.”107 The U.S. Supreme Court has followed 
                                                                                                                           
101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. Additionally, unlike New York, the targets established in the Pennsylvania regulation 
simply create a rebuttable presumption that the amount of lost and unaccounted for gas is excessive. 
Id. § 59.111(c)(3). If a gas company exceeds the regulatory target, a gas company may demonstrate 
that its level of lost and unaccounted for gas is warranted. Id. Although the regulation is ambiguous 
as to whether this means the company may recover the actual lost and unaccounted for gas above 
the target if it can show that its amount of lost and unaccounted for gas is warranted, such an out-
come is likely the intent. See id. (creating a rebuttable presumption that prescribed percentages of 
lost and unaccounted for gas may be permitted from ratepayers). 
 104 See H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6 (Mass. 2015). H.B. 2870 was referred to the Joint 
Committee on Telecommunications, Utilities, and Energy, received a public hearing on November 
17, 2015, and was reported for further study on April 7, 2016. H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6 
(Mass. 2015), https://malegislature.gov/Bills/189/H2870 [https://perma.cc/7RJV-NJM2]. 
 105 See H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 2015).  
 106 See MOGEL, supra note 20, at 1A-15 § 15.05 (explaining that all utility companies have a 
legal duty to provide service at certain universal standards). 
 107 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.030 (West 2009) (requiring “just and reasonable” 
rates); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2016) (authorizing the New York Public Service 
Commission to set “just and reasonable prices”); 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1308(c) 
(West 1984) (providing the public utility commission with the authority to set “just and reasona-
ble” utility company rates); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(a) (West 2016) (providing the West 
Virginia Public Utility Commission authority to “fix reasonable rates”); Bay State Gas Co. v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 947 N.E.2d 1077, 1085 (Mass. 2011) (interpreting Massachusetts statute 
requiring the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities to investigate the propriety of gas dis-
tribution company rate increases to require said Department to find that the rates are “just and 
reasonable”). 
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the guiding principle that the U.S. Constitution protects utility companies 
from being limited to charging rates that are so low as to be confiscatory.108 
According to the Court, if the utility company does not receive sufficient 
compensation, the State has violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution by setting confiscatory rates that constitute a taking 
without adequate compensation.109 Section A of this Part discusses the state 
law under which PUCs regulate natural gas distribution companies.110 Section 
B discusses the limits on rate regulation imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.111 
A. Controlling Monopoly: Examining the Utility Regulatory  
Statutory Scheme 
Where policymakers consider an industry to be a “natural monopoly,” 
government may regulate the monopolist firm’s profit and rates.112 Subsec-
tion 1 of this section describes the statutory scheme for controlling and setting 
rates, administered by state PUCs, that states impose on utility companies 
such as natural gas distribution companies.113 Subsection 2 then describes 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); see also Bluefield Waterworks 
& Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923) (noting that it is 
well established that a state public utility commission cannot regulate prices in a manner that rises 
to the level of confiscatory). 
 109 Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 308. Interestingly, Congress has withdrawn jurisdiction from 
federal district courts regarding any challenge to a rate-setting order of a public utility commis-
sion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (prohibiting federal district courts from exercising equitable 
remedies against rate orders of state public utility commissions if there is an adequate state judi-
cial review process). 
 110 See infra notes 112–146 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 147–164 and accompanying text. 
 112 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982) (discussing economic 
regulation); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 50 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing reasons that policymakers find economic regulation necessary); 
Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 905, 925 (2010) (comparing retail electricity with groceries to explain why regulators control 
prices for natural monopolies but not for competitive firms); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, 
The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 131, 134 (2012) (describing how policymakers traditionally considered many aspects of 
electric and gas markets to be natural monopolies and thus the regulators controlled rates, terms, 
and conditions of service); Laura Kaplan, One Merger, Two Agencies: Dual Review in the Break-
down of the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger and a Proposal for Reform, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1571, 1581–82 
(2012) (discussing the initial history of telecommunications regulation as the product of natural 
monopoly). A “natural monopoly” exists where the costs of doing business would be significantly 
greater if more than one competing firm served a group of customers. BREYER, supra, at 15; see 
also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) (noting that where towns 
could support only one electricity distribution system, each town was a “natural monopoly mar-
ket” for retail electricity sales). 
 113 See infra notes 115–140 and accompanying text. 
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new statutory directives imposed on state public utility commissions in some 
states in response to climate change.114  
1. Ensuring “Just and Reasonable” Rates 
State PUCs regulate the rates that natural gas distribution companies 
charge their customers, and generally, state statutes require that rates be 
“just and reasonable.”115 Decisions setting rates are reviewable by state 
courts.116 Reviewing courts provide state PUCs with broad discretion to 
ensure just and reasonable rates under the applicable regulatory statutes.117 
Although commissions are provided considerable deference, rate regu-
lation is generally justified when competition cannot exist or is ineffective, 
and in those circumstances, regulation is designed to achieve the results that 
would have been produced by effective competition, if feasible.118 In a 
competitive market, market forces fix prices, generally beyond the control 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 141–146 and accompanying text. 
 115 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.030 (requiring “just and reasonable” rates); N.Y. 
PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (authorizing the New York Public Service Commission to set “just and 
reasonable prices”); 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1308(c) (providing the public utility 
commission with the authority to set “just and reasonable” utility company rates); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 24-2-3 (providing the West Virginia Public Utility Commission authority to “fix reasona-
ble rates”); Bay State Gas Co., 947 N.E.2d at 1085 (interpreting Massachusetts statute requiring 
the Massachusetts Department of Public utilities to investigate the propriety of gas distribution 
company rate increases to require said Department to find that the rates are “just and reasonable”). 
 116 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 2016) (explaining appeal process in 
Massachusetts). 
 117 See, e.g., In re Kauai Elec. Div. of Citizens Utils. Co., 590 P.2d 524, 5 34 (Haw. 1978) 
(noting that statutory language provided the state commission with broad discretion); Bos. Edison 
Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 375 N.E.2d 305, 313 (Mass. 1978) (providing for broad discretion); 
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 926 N.E.2d 261, 268 (Ohio 2010) (stating that 
commissions receive broad discretion when setting rates). 
 118 See City of Chi. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 385 F.2d 629, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (explaining 
that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the type of service that would be provided and similar 
prices to what a firm would charge if it was subject to competition); State Pub. Utils. Comm’n ex 
rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 125 N.E. 891, 896 (Ill. 1919) (explaining 
that rate regulation occurs because certain firms are natural monopolies and rate setting might 
come close to providing a rate that firms might charge if competition in the industry were possi-
ble); State ex rel. Sprint Mo., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State, 165 S.W.3d 160, 161–62 (Mo. 
2005) (explaining that the purpose of certain rate regulation is to emulate the results of competi-
tion where competition cannot exist); R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, VERIZON-RHODE ISLAND’S 
SUCCESSOR ALTERNATIVE REGULATION PLAN, 3692, at 22–23 (Mar. 17, 2006), 2006 WL 789486 
(explaining that regulators should regulate industry in a manner that would result in similar rates, 
terms and conditions that would occur if the firm were subject to “effective competition”); Harold 
Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth 
Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989, 990 (1965) (stating the same); Leonard D. White, The Origin of 
Utility Commissions in Massachusetts, 29 J. POL. ECON. 177, 196 (1921) (noting that a major 
factor behind legislation providing for state supervision of gas companies in Massachusetts was 
driven by popular belief that monopoly power resulted in monopoly prices and excessive profits at 
consumer expense). 
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of the company.119 Whereas a firm in a competitive market cannot increase 
prices, a firm that increases its efficiency may be able to increase profits by 
lowering its costs.120 A firm that has lowered its costs may attempt to in-
crease profits further by offering lower prices, thereby gaining market share 
but ultimately lowering the market price if enough competitors have made 
similar cost reductions.121 Competing firms that were unable to lower costs 
will realize lower profits or will be unable to continue participating in the 
market at the lower market price.122 Therefore, competition provides at least 
two incentives to increase efficiency and lower costs: efficiency as the pri-
mary path to increased profits and efficiency out of fear that a failure to 
keep up with competitors’ efficiency gains will lower market prices to be-
low the firm’s costs.123 
Traditionally, state PUCs have held rates for monopolistic firms to be 
“just and reasonable” when they were established using cost-of-service 
ratemaking.124 Under cost-of-service ratemaking, the regulator determines a 
company’s revenue requirement by selecting a test year, adding up the com-
pany’s costs of doing business during that test year and adding a reasonable 
profit to those costs.125 The regulator then sets a price so that the firm’s pro-
jected revenue matches the revenue requirement.126 When price assures re-
covery of any costs, the firm has little incentive, which would be available 
in a competitive environment, to be more efficient or to adopt cost-saving 
devices, because any savings from decreased costs flow to consumers.127 
In order to meet the statutory purpose of emulating the results of com-
petition, regulators have relied on “rate-setting lag” to incentivize efficiency 
gains.128 If the set prices remain in effect for numerous years, the regulated 
                                                                                                                           
119 See PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 112, at 61–62, 65–68 (discussing perfect competition and 
workable competition); CLAIR WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 10–11 (4th ed. 
1971) (discussing market prices in a competitive market economy); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (noting that a firm is monopolistic when it can increase 
prices). 
120 See BREYER, supra note 112, at 47 (discussing incentives in a competitive market). 
121 See id. (describing how a firm subject to competition faces different efficiency incentives 
than a regulated monopoly). 
122 See id. (explaining why firms in a competitive market are likely to behave efficiently). 
 123 See id. (noting the reasons why a competitive firm reduces its costs). 
 124 See id. at 36 (noting that natural monopolies are regulated using a cost of service ratemak-
ing model). 
 125 Id. at 36–37. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 47. Inflated costs that result from a rate regulated monopoly’s ability to pass along 
its prudently incurred costs to consumers in its rates results from what is sometimes called “gold-
plating,” a metaphor of a telephone monopolist using gold wire where copper wire would have 
sufficed. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLI-
CY 219 (4th ed. 2015). 
 128 BREYER, supra note 112, at 48. 
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firm has an incentive to reduce costs or increase sales and to keep the addi-
tional profits earned until the next comprehensive adjustment of rates, 
where those increased efficiencies may be shared with consumers.129 
Where commissions moved away from traditional ratemaking to set 
“just and reasonable” rates, commissions have attempted to replace traditional 
ratemaking with alternative ratemaking approaches that the commissions be-
lieve are more likely to provide a monopolistic firm with similar incentives as 
a firm subject to effective competition.130 For example, throughout the 1990s, 
many states and the Federal Communications Commission transitioned 
from traditional regulation to “price cap” regulation for telecommunications 
services in order to achieve “just and reasonable” rates.131 Price cap regula-
                                                                                                                           
 129 BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 127, at 219; BREYER, supra note 112, at 48. 
 130 See In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6787 
(1990) (replacing traditional regulation with price cap regulation for interstate telephone local 
exchange carriers); In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 38, 44 (Me. 
P.U.C. 1995) (replacing traditional regulation with price cap regulation for Maine local and intra-
state telephone services); Telephone Regulatory Methods, 157 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 465, 471 
(Va. State Corp. Comm’n 1994) (replacing traditional regulation with price cap regulation for 
Virginia local and intrastate telephone services); Gregory J. Vogt, Cap-Sized: How the Promise of 
the Price Cap Voyage to Competition Was Lost in a Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 
349, 384 (1999) (explaining how the FCC’s goal in replacing traditional regulation with price cap 
regulation was to more accurately emulate competition). 
 131 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (requiring “just and reasonable” rates); Policy & Rules 
Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. at 6787, 6801 (noting that the commis-
sion’s design of a price cap system adequately balances competing goals of benefits from in-
creased productivity promised by the price cap program’s creation of new incentives for local 
telephone exchange carriers and assuring just and reasonable rates and continued availability of 
quality services); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 324, 345 (Ala. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n 1995) (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation for intrastate tele-
communications services in Alabama); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 
4th at 44 (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation for intrastate telecom-
munications services in Maine); BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 438, 
470 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n 1996) (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation 
for intrastate telecommunications services in North Carolina); BellSouth, 169 Pub. Util. Rep. 
(PUR) 4th 144, 158 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1996) (transitioning to price cap regulation from 
traditional regulation for intrastate telecommunications services in South Carolina); Telephone 
Regulatory Methods, 157 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 471 (transitioning to price cap regulation 
from traditional regulation for intrastate telecommunication services in Virginia); Vogt, supra note 
130, at 384 (explaining that many state regulators adopted some version of a price cap regulation 
for telecommunications carriers in the 1980s and 1990s). Although these regulators were imple-
menting their statutory mandates of ensuring just and reasonable rates, many state legislatures 
provided statutory permission or requirements for state public utility commissions to adopt price 
cap regimes. See e.g., 1993 Me. P.L. 1689, 1689 (permitting the Maine Public Utilities Commis-
sion to adopt an alternative regarding rate regulation methodology). In 1999, in Office of People’s 
Counsel v. Maryland Public Service Commission, the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered 
the impact of traditional statutory “just and reasonable” requirements that coexist with statutory 
provisions permitting price cap or alternative regulation. 733 A.2d 996, 998–99 (Md. 1999). In 
1995, the Maryland Legislature passed a statute permitting the state’s public utility commission to 
regulate telephone companies using alternative means. Id. at 1000 (citing Maryland Code Article 
78, § 69(e) (repealed)). The Maryland code still required “just and reasonable” rates. See id. (cit-
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tion created an incentive-based system that rewards companies for being 
more productive and efficient, where ratepayers share efficiency gains.132 
Price caps discourage regulated companies from asking for cost-based rate 
increases by setting a rate designed to last for a considerable time period, 
but permitting the company to raise its prices at the rate of inflation de-
creased by some amount because the regulators expect the firm to increase 
productivity.133 Price cap regulation gives utility companies an ability to 
make their own decisions about how to use resources in managing their 
businesses without close regulatory oversight, and if a utility company can 
find ways to lower costs, it may keep some or all of the supplemental reve-
nue as profit.134 
In addition to attempting to emulate firm behavior in a competitive 
market, state PUCs often consider other public policy objectives when es-
tablishing “just and reasonable” rates.135 Sometimes commissions set rates 
that achieve these policy objectives even when doing so requires the firm to 
operate under conditions that are dissimilar to a firm operating in a competi-
tive market.136 For example, in 2007, the New York Public Service Com-
mission moved away from price cap regulation and implemented a “decou-
pling” form of traditional regulation.137 Under decoupling, the regulator sets 
                                                                                                                           
ing Maryland Code Article 73 § 68(a)). Unlike many other states, however, the Maryland code 
specifically defined “just and reasonable” to imply rate of return regulation. Id. (citing Maryland 
Code Article 73 § 69(a)). After the 1995 statute took effect, the state’s commission issued its price 
cap orders establishing a telephone rate using price cap regulation. Id. The Court ultimately held 
that the requirement of section 68(a) that the commission has the authority to determine just and 
reasonable rates continues to apply whereas the specific definition based on rate of return regula-
tion set forth in section 69(a) does not apply when rates are set using an alternative form of regula-
tion. Id. at 1008. 
 132 See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. at 6787 (de-
scribing the objectives of a price cap regulation regime). 
 133 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 386 (2d ed. 
1995) (describing price cap regulation). 
 134 See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 150 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining the benefits and drawbacks of price cap regula-
tion). 
 135 See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., RATE STRUCTURES THAT WILL PROMOTE EFFI-
CIENT DEPLOYMENT OF DEMAND RESOURCES, Order No. 07-50-A, at 8–9 (July 16, 2008), 2008 
WL 2937826 (noting that an alternative ratemaking scheme may be necessary in order to ensure 
that disincentives from effective energy efficiency and demand response programs are eliminat-
ed); N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CASE 03-E-0640, ORDER REQUIRING PROPOSALS FOR REVENUE 
DECOUPLING MECHANISMS, at 2–3 (Apr. 20, 2007) (noting that existing rate structures may disin-
centivize electric companies from promoting energy efficiency programs and renewable energy 
and requiring a new rate structure to eliminate that disincentive). 
 136 See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 135, at 48 (describing the implications 
of a newly ordered business model as eliminating the link between growth in sales and growth in 
revenue); N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 135, at 3 (describing the aspects of rate design 
being reformed). 
 137 N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 135, at 2–3. 
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the company’s total revenue requirement in a full rate proceeding and pro-
vides for annual increases or decreases to the per kilowatt rates based upon 
actual sales volumes, so that the company does not increase its total revenue 
by increasing electric sales, and will not lose revenue if it decreases total 
sales.138 This approach may provide incentives that are dissimilar to those 
that a firm in a competitive market may face.139 Instead, the rate structure is 
designed to remove the disincentives in the traditional approach to the utili-
ty company’s promotion of energy efficiency, which is intended to reduce 
sales volumes.140 
2. Acknowledging and Accounting for the Energy Sector’s Climate Change 
Impacts: Examining New State Climate Change Statutes 
Some statutes require PUCs to consider the impacts of their decisions 
on climate change.141 For example, the Massachusetts Global Warming So-
lutions Act (“GWSA”) requires all Massachusetts agencies conducting ad-
judications to take foreseeable impacts of global warming into account 
when making administrative decisions.142 The Massachusetts DPU has de-
termined that this statute applies to its administrative decisions, at least 
where the decision may impact the state’s greenhouse gas reduction man-
dates.143 
The DPU has used the GWSA to encourage regulated utility compa-
nies to change behavior in a manner that helps achieve the state’s green-
house gas emissions reduction requirements.144 It used the GWSA provision 
to approve a settlement agreement between two companies desiring to 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See id. at 8 (explaining how decoupling functions); see also MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., 
supra note 135, at 48 (describing decoupling). 
 139 See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 135, at 7–8 (describing how decoupling is de-
signed to remove the link between utility sales and revenues). 
 140 Id. The “decoupled” rate structure still provides the company with incentives to earn addi-
tional revenue between rate cases by lowering its costs of doing business because the company is 
still entitled to collect its total revenue requirement from customers. See id. at 8 (describing how 
revenue decoupling functions). 
 141 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 61 (West 2016) (requiring state administrative 
agencies to consider relevant impacts of global warming when making administrative decisions). 
 142 Id. 
 143 See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., JOINT PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF MERGER BETWEEN 
NSTAR & NORTHEAST UTILITIES, Order No. 10-170, at 25–26 (Mar. 10, 2011), 2011 WL 1111829 
(interlocutory order on standard of review) (applying statute in an administrative proceeding). 
 144 See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., JOINT PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF MERGER BE-
TWEEN NSTAR & NORTHEAST UTILITIES, Order No. 10-170-B, at 80 (Apr. 4, 2012), 2012 WL 
1484182 (concluding that elements of a merger-settlement agreement promoting energy efficien-
cy, renewable energy, and electric vehicles are factors in favor of the merger because of the stat-
ute’s application); see also id. at 77 (explaining that the statute requires the Department of Public 
Utilities to consider climate change impacts as part of the standard of review for considering ap-
proval of merging utility companies). 
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merge but needing the approval of the DPU and numerous intervenors, in-
cluding the Massachusetts Attorney General and the state’s Energy Policy 
Office.145 The DPU found that provisions in the settlement agreement re-
quiring the merged company to procure contracts for solar energy, to estab-
lish electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and to increase their energy ef-
ficiency savings targets provided “net benefits for ratepayers” in light of the 
GWSA provisions.146 
B. Preventing the Regulator from Going Too Far: Examining the 
Constitutional Constraints on Rate Regulation 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 147 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies the Fifth 
Amendment to the States.148 If the government physically possesses or oc-
cupies private property, the Supreme Court has held that to be a taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment.149 Even when not physically possessing or occu-
pying private property, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Gov-
ernment or the States violate the Fifth Amendment when they “in substance 
and effect” deprive a company of the use of its capital by inhibiting a com-
pany from charging reasonable rates for the use of its invested capital.150 
The Court has made numerous decisions determining the limits of 
State and Federal authority to regulate rates before constituting a taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.151 In 1935, in West Ohio Gas 
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, the Court considered an appeal 
of an order by the Ohio Public Utility Commission that fixed the retail rates 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See id. at 80 (finding that elements of a merger settlement agreement providing increased 
support for energy efficiency and renewable energy favored approval of the settlement agree-
ment). 
 146 Id. at 83. 
 147 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 148 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”); Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 472 
n.1 (2005) (noting that the Fifth Amendment governs state actions because of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (applying Fifth 
Amendment takings clause jurisprudence to States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 149 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (holding 
that takings occur when real property is physically occupied). 
 150 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 523 (1898), rev’d on other grounds by Fed. Power Comm'n 
v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
 151 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (holding that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting rate 
regulators from considering certain costs to establish an electric rate did not violate the takings 
clause); Fed. Power Comm’n, 315 U.S. at 598 (upholding an order of the Federal Power Commis-
sion under the Natural Gas Act as not violating the takings clause); W. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 67 (1935) (concluding that the Ohio PUC set a gas company’s 
rates beneath a constitutionally permissible level). 
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of a gas distribution company.152 After considering numerous issues includ-
ing the Commission’s restriction on the amount of lost and unaccounted for 
gas that the Company was authorized to recover from its customers, the 
Court held that the Commission unconstitutionally set the company’s rates 
too low in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.153 During the ratemak-
ing proceeding before the Commission, the company had reported its aver-
age lost and unaccounted for gas at nine percent per year, but the Commis-
sion designed the company’s rates in a manner that only permitted the com-
pany to earn revenue to cover seven percent lost and unaccounted for gas.154 
Although the Commission agreed that the actual lost and unaccounted for 
gas during the test year was nine percent, the Commission believed that the 
company could achieve less than seven percent lost and unaccounted for 
gas if it managed its system better.155 After reviewing the record before the 
Commission, the Court found that the record lacked anything demonstrating 
the Commission’s determination that poor management led to a level of lost 
and unaccounted for gas as high as nine percent.156 The Court, therefore, 
held that the Commission’s decision to eliminate the two percent lost gas 
from the company’s revenue requirement was arbitrary and unconstitution-
al.157 The Court defined its inquiry in rate cases appealed to the Supreme 
Court as whether “in the totality of the consequences” the state commis-
sion’s action permits the regulated company to earn enough revenue from 
customers so as not to be confiscatory.158 
Despite West Ohio Gas being a Lochner-era decision, utility company 
ratemaking has been subject to Supreme Court review for confiscatory tak-
ings in the post-Lochner era.159 In 1989, in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 
                                                                                                                           
 152 W. Ohio Gas Co., 294 U.S. at 67. 
 153 Id. at 67, 75. The Court referred to lost and unaccounted for gas as “unaccounted for gas” 
and defined the term as “gas lost as a result of leakage, condensation, expansion, or contraction.” 
Id. at 67. The Court noted that even the most well-operated natural gas distribution companies 
may not be able to avoid at least some degree of lost or unaccounted for gas. Id. 
154 Id. at 67–68. 
 155 Id. at 68. 
 156 Id. Although the Court agreed with the Commission that costs incurred by the company 
because of negligence or waste should not be recovered from customers, the Court noted that the 
state commission must establish a company’s waste or negligence through some kind of eviden-
tiary record. Id. 
 157 Id. The Court held that the removal of this cost of business among others that the Commis-
sion removed in this case resulted in a net reduction in the revenue the Company was authorized 
to recover from customers in rates in a manner that was unconstitutionally low for a gas distribu-
tion company. Id. at 75. 
 158 Id. at 70. Additionally, that level of revenue must be obtained “with suitable opportunity 
through evidence and argument.” Id. 
 159 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (upholding a state statute limiting recovery of certain 
costs in rates as constitutional); Fed. Power Comm’n, 315 U.S. at 591 (upholding a rate order of 
the Federal Power Commission as not violating the takings clause). In 1905, in Lochner v. New 
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the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution protects utility companies from 
being limited to a charge for their property serving the public that is so low 
and unjust as to be confiscatory.160 If a rate does not afford sufficient com-
pensation, the State is deemed to take the use of the utility’s property, that 
is, its capital, without paying just compensation and therefore violates the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.161 The Court, however, clarified that the 
Constitution does not require courts to review specific costs incurred by the 
utility in order to set a rate.162 The Court refused to review the methodology 
of how the PUC established a rate to determine whether it was confiscatory 
in effect.163 Using this reasoning, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute 
proscribing a certain method of ratemaking would not necessarily result in a 
constitutionally impermissible rate.164 
                                                                                                                           
York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a New York labor statute limiting the amount of hours that 
certain employees could work violated the right to contract that the Court claimed was part of the 
individual’s liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 198 
U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (protecting the freedom to contract as a substantive due process right). Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein describes the Lochner Era as a time when the Supreme Court tried to establish 
areas where states or the federal government could not interfere through regulation. Cass R. Sun-
stein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697 (1984). Where 
regulation looked like an attempt for one social class or a majority to use raw power to extract 
benefits from another minority class, regulation was impermissible. See id. (explaining the Loch-
ner era). Because state regulation of public utility rates could be seen as an attempt by the benefi-
ciaries of legislation, the ratepayers, to exercise political power to limit potential return on invest-
ment by utility companies and their investors, utility company ratemaking cases could be consid-
ered classic Lochner Era cases. See, e.g., W. Ohio Gas Co., 294 U.S. at 77 (requiring increased gas 
rates for a gas company to protect the company’s constitutional rights because the commission had 
set rates unconstitutionally low and at times based on findings unsupported by evidence); see also 
West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Balt. City, 295 U.S. 662, 679 (1935) (striking down a 
Maryland Commission order setting telephone company rates); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1934) (striking down an Ohio Public Utilities 
Commission order setting the price to be charged for natural gas as taking away the company’s 
property without due process of law). The Lochner Era is said to have ended in 1937 when the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish that explicitly overruled an 
earlier holding and upheld a state law establishing a minimum wage for women. 300 U.S. 379, 
400 (1937); see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754 (6th ed. 2009) (stating 
that many consider West Coast Hotel to have ended the Lochner era); Michael J. Phillips, The 
Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1998) (stating the same). 
 160 488 U.S. at 307. 
 161 See id. (describing the constitutional limits of rate regulation). 
 162 See id. at 313 (rejecting contentions that the Constitution requires the Court to review the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s failure, pursuant to state statutory requirements, to 
review and recover construction costs of unfinished nuclear generating facilities as a concern not 
of the scale necessary to raise constitutional concerns). 
 163 See id. at 314 (refusing to review the methodology of a rate order provided that the out-
come was constitutionally sufficient); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 
602 (1944) (explaining that the Court looks only at the result of the rate order and not how an 
agency determined it to analyze if it is reasonable and does not result in a taking). 
 164 Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315. A Pennsylvania statute passed shortly before the contro-
versy required the Pennsylvania PUC to set electricity rates in a manner that excluded recovery of 
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III. LET’S END THE RISK-FREE RIDE: IT IS TIME FOR PUBLIC UTILITY 
COMMISSIONS TO RE-IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON UNLIMITED RECOVERY  
OF LOST AND UNACCOUNTED FOR GAS THROUGH PURCHASED  
GAS ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
State PUCs should limit cost recovery of lost and unaccounted for gas 
because a cost recovery limit incentivizes natural gas distribution compa-
nies to control the causes of lost and unaccounted for gas when doing so is 
economic, lowering costs for consumers and providing environmental and 
public safety benefits.165 Section A of this Part argues that the total recovery 
approach is inconsistent with the purposes of statutes enacted to ensure that 
natural gas rates are “just and reasonable.”166 Section B argues that a capped 
approach would not be considered an unconstitutional regulatory taking.167 
A. Recovery of Unlimited Lost and Unaccounted for Gas Through 
Purchased Gas Adjustment Mechanisms is Consistent with  
Statutory Purposes Behind Rate Regulation  
Because the total recovery method of cost recovery fails to provide the 
company with any incentive to reduce costs over which it exercises some 
control, state public utility commissions should reject the total recovery ap-
                                                                                                                           
costs associated with each company’s expenditures for electrical generating facilities that were 
planned but never built, even when those expenditures were not unreasonable when the company 
decided to make the expenditure. See id. at 301. The statute was passed after, in response to pre-
dictions to increased demand for electricity, a number of Pennsylvania utility companies entered a 
joint venture in the late 1960s to build seven nuclear generating units. Id. at 302. In 1980, the 
participating utilities canceled the plans for the construction of these plans, in part because of the 
impact of the Arab oil embargo and associated policies on electricity demand and because of the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Id. At the time that these facilities’ construction was can-
celled, the construction costs that were spent on the cancelled plants were over $34 million. Id. 
 In 1944, in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., the U.S. Supreme Court 
clarified that rate-setting bodies are not bound to use a single formula in determining rates. 320 
U.S. at 602. Instead, a Commission must ensure that the final rate, however a Commission decides 
to set that rate, is not so low as to provide the utility company a return on its investment that is so 
low to be confiscatory. See id. (noting that a rate is not confiscatory looking at the whole rate that 
the company charges, not because of aspects of the rate-making process). 
 165 See City of Chi. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 385 F.2d 629, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (explaining 
that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the type of service that would be provided and similar 
prices to what a firm would charge if it was subject to competition because competition incentiv-
izes firms to reduce costs or face losing market share); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, 
at 6 (discussing the benefits to New York gas ratepayers from limiting cost recovery of lost and 
unaccounted for gas); PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public 
safety and climate change impacts of lost and unaccounted for gas); CLEVELAND, supra note 23, 
at 12 (discussing the climate change and public safety policy benefits of lost and unaccounted for 
gas recovery restrictions on fixing leaks). 
 166 See infra notes 168–183 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
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proach.168 Commissions design “just and reasonable” rates that provide com-
panies similar incentives to a firm in a competitive environment.169 Commis-
sions also consider public policy goals in designing utility company rates to 
be “just and reasonable.”170 The ability of gas companies in the majority of 
states to recover unlimited lost and unaccounted for gas in gas adjustment 
clauses (1) fails to provide efficiency incentives similar to those they would 
face if they were subject to competition, and (2) fails to address other public 
policy concerns.171 Accordingly, state commissions should adopt a capped 
approach using historical averaging, such as that in New York.172 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See City of Chi., 385 F.2d at 636 (explaining that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the 
type of service that would be provided and similar prices to what a firm would charge if it was 
subject to competition and in competition firms have incentive to reduce costs or face losing mar-
ket share); State Pub. Utils. Comm’n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 
125 N.E. 891, 896 (Ill. 1919) (explaining that rate regulation occurs because certain firms are 
natural monopolies and rate setting might come close to providing a rate that firms might charge if 
competition in the industry was possible, and in competition firms charge prices approaching cost 
or face losing market share); State ex rel. Sprint Mo., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State, 165 
S.W.3d 160, 161–62 (Mo. 2005) (explaining that the purpose of certain rate regulation is to emu-
late the results of competition where competition cannot exist); R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra 
note 118 (explaining that regulators should regulate industry in a manner that would result in simi-
lar rates, terms and conditions that would occur if the firm was subject to “effective competition” 
and in competition firms have incentives to reduce costs or face losing market share); Leventhal, 
supra note 118, at 990 (explaining that regulators should regulate industry in a manner that would 
result in similar rates, terms, and conditions that would occur if the firm were subject to competi-
tion); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6–7 (explaining how the total recovery ap-
proach functions in New York and provides the gas company with an incentive to reduce costs 
that are also eventually shared with ratepayers in the form of lower rates); PA. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N, supra note 99 (replacing the total recovery approach with a command and control ap-
proach as “just and reasonable”). 
 169 See City of Chi., 385 F.2d at 636 (explaining that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the 
type of service that would be provided and similar prices to what a firm would charge if it were 
subject to competition); Sprint Mo., Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 161–62 (explaining that the purpose of 
certain rate regulation is to emulate the results of competition where competition cannot exist); 
Springfield Gas & Elec., 125 N.E. at 896 (explaining that rate regulation occurs because certain 
firms are natural monopolies and rate setting might come close to providing a rate that firms might 
charge if competition in the industry were possible); R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 118 
(explaining that regulators should regulate industry in a manner that would result in similar rates, 
terms, and conditions that would occur if the firm were subject to “effective competition”); Le-
venthal, supra note 118, at 990 (stating the same). 
 170 See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 135 (concluding that gas and electric 
companies must redesign rates to reduce the disincentive toward demand resources and that such a 
decision is within the agency’s statutory authority); N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 135 
(noting that existing rate structures may disincentivize electric companies from promoting energy 
efficiency programs and renewable energy and requiring a new rate structure to eliminate that 
disincentive). But see Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033–34 (Mass. 
1994) (noting that the Massachusetts Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it re-
quired electric company investment in more expensive electricity generation because it did not 
have delegated authority to consider the impact of pollution on society). 
 171 See CLEVELAND, supra note 23, at 12 (discussing the climate change and public safety 
policy benefits of lost and unaccounted for gas recovery restrictions on fixing leaks); Costello, 
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The historical averaging approach is consistent with the statutory pur-
poses behind rate regulation because it provides the firm with incentives to 
reduce costs over which it has control.173 Lost and unaccounted for gas is a 
cost over which the company exercises some degree of control, like the 
general cost of service.174 If a gas distribution company was subject to ef-
fective competition, the company would repair all leaks and terminate unau-
thorized gas use to the extent doing so was an economically efficient use of 
the company’s resources.175 In a jurisdiction where complete recovery of 
lost and unaccounted for gas costs within the purchased gas adjustment fac-
tor is permitted, the company has no economic incentive to implement these 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 15, at 19 (noting that utilities exercise a “degree of control” over the causes of lost and 
unaccounted for gas); Foy, supra note 61, at 670 (noting that adjustment clauses like the pur-
chased gas adjustment clause should only be applied to costs that the company cannot control 
because if it is applied to controllable costs, the clause might cause rates to increase as a lack of an 
incentive to control those underlying controllable costs will result in poor company cost manage-
ment). 
 172 See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 87 (implementing the historical aver-
aging approach in New York State). 
 173 See City of Chi., 385 F.2d at 636 (explaining that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the 
type of service that would be provided and similar prices to what a firm would charge if it were 
subject to competition); Sprint Mo., Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 161–62 (explaining that the purpose of 
certain rate regulation is to emulate the results of competition where competition cannot exist); 
Springfield Gas & Elec., 125 N.E. at 896 (explaining that rate regulation occurs because certain 
firms are natural monopolies and rate setting might come close to providing a rate that firms might 
charge if competition in the industry was possible); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 
6–7 (explaining how the total recovery approach functions in New York and provides the gas 
company with an incentive to reduce costs that are also eventually shared with ratepayers in the 
form of lower rates); PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 99 (replacing the total recovery approach 
with a command and control approach as “just and reasonable”). 
 174 See CONN. PUB. UTILS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 24, at 1 (finding the largest 
component contributing to lost and unaccounted for gas to be Low Pressure Metering and System 
Pressure for two natural gas distribution companies and measurement sources for a third distribu-
tion company); ICF INT’L, supra note 5, at 1-1 (noting numerous factors that lost and unaccounted 
for gas represents that a gas distribution company may be able to control); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. 
SERV., supra note 21, at 16–21 (describing factors that contribute to lost and unaccounted for gas 
as including meter issues and error, meter reading issues, Therm billing, leaks, and theft of ser-
vice); Costello, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that utilities exercise a “degree of control” over the 
causes of lost and unaccounted for gas). For example, a company has an ability to repair leaks on 
its distribution pipelines and to terminate service at accounts where theft of service may be occur-
ring. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 28, at 43 (noting that there were many leaks on 
the gas distribution systems in 2014 and the companies are engaged in repair programs to fix those 
leaks); e.g., THE PEOPLES GAS LIGHT AND COKE CO., TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, ILL. 
C. C. No. 28, at 2, http://www.peoplesgasdelivery.com/company/tariffs/terms.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z2TV-TT3T] (providing in the tariff of a gas company terms and conditions permitting the 
company to terminate service at certain premises when gas is being used without a recorded ac-
count holder, demonstrating that the company has an ability to reduce unaccounted for gas from 
theft of service). 
 175 See BREYER, supra note 112, at 49 (discussing incentives in a competitive market). 
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cost-saving actions.176 In such cases, the environment, and public safety are 
also compromised.177 
Because this method of total cost recovery fails to provide the compa-
ny with any incentive to reduce costs over which it exercises some control, 
state PUCs should reject this total recovery approach, and instead, commis-
sions should adopt New York’s historical averaging approach to lost and 
unaccounted for gas recovery.178 Furthermore, subjecting gas distribution 
companies to rate-setting lag for lost and unaccounted for gas also incentiv-
izes efforts to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas, consistent with state and 
federal regulation attempts to further incentivize rate regulated companies 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See, e.g., 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.06 (setting forth the formula for gas adjustment factors 
in a total recovery jurisdiction generally as the total volume of gas purchased by the company 
divided by the total amount of sales made by the company to its customers); NRRI REPORT, supra 
note 16, at 58–62 (providing state commission responses regarding what incentive each state 
commission provides its regulated companies to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas); Foy, supra 
note 61, at 670 (noting that adjustment clauses like the purchased gas adjustment clause should 
only be applied to costs that the company cannot control because if it is applied to controllable 
costs, the clause might cause rates to increase as a lack of an incentive to control those underlying 
controllable costs will result in poor company management of those costs). Therefore, any mini-
mal emulation of the competitive market that would be achieved by rate-setting lag associated 
with lost and unaccounted for gas would provide the company an ability to earn additional reve-
nue by lowering lost and unaccounted for gas expense. See BREYER, supra note 112, at 48 (noting 
that regulated companies can earn more profit than permitted by regulators by lowering costs 
between rate cases). Additionally, a failure to address lost and unaccounted for gas expenses 
would result in decreased revenue. See id. (explaining how a regulated company may make less 
profit than permitted by regulators because of inflation if it cannot decrease cost). 
 177 See PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public safety and climate 
change impacts of lost and unaccounted for gas); BREYER, supra note 112, at 48 (discussing how 
rate-setting lag creates incentives to reduce cost similar to those that pressure competitive firms to 
lower costs); Foy, supra note 61, at 670 (noting that adjustment clauses like the purchased gas ad-
justment clause should only be applied to costs that the company cannot control because if it is ap-
plied to controllable costs, the clause might cause rates to increase as a lack of an incentive to control 
those underlying controllable costs will result in poor company management of those costs). 
 178 See City of Chi., 385 F.2d at 636 (explaining that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the 
type of service that would be provided and similar prices to what a firm would charge if it were 
subject to competition because in competition firms have incentive to reduce costs or face losing 
market share); Sprint Mo., Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 161–62 (explaining that the purpose of certain rate 
regulation is to emulate the results of competition where competition cannot exist);Springfield Gas 
& Elec., 125 N.E. at 896 (explaining that rate regulation occurs because certain firms are natural 
monopolies and rate setting might come close to providing a rate that firms might charge if com-
petition in the industry were possible and in competition firms charge prices approaching cost or 
face losing market share); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6–7 (explaining how the 
total recovery approach functions in New York and provides the gas company with an incentive to 
reduce costs that are also eventually shared with ratepayers in the form of lower rates); PA. PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 99 (replacing the total recovery approach with a command and control 
approach as “just and reasonable”); R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 118 (explaining that 
regulators should regulate industry in a manner that would result in similar rates, terms, and condi-
tions that would occur if the firm were subject to “effective competition” and in competition firms 
have incentives to reduce costs or face losing market share); Leventhal, supra note 118, at 990 
(stating the same). 
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to reduce cost of service in a manner more similar to a firm acting in a 
competitive market.179 
Additionally, state commissions should adopt a capped approach be-
cause it would achieve public policy goals of increased public safety and 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions.180 Injecting such limitations, as well as 
rate-setting lag into the cost recovery of lost and unaccounted for gas may 
accomplish policy objectives of providing gas distribution companies with 
an additional incentive to reduce leaks that contribute to climate change and 
pose public safety risks.181 These limitations on the cost recovery of lost 
and unaccounted for gas may provide state regulators with the unique abil-
ity to simultaneously pursue policy goals of increased safety, decreased en-
vironmentally harmful emissions, while not sacrificing the aim of regulating 
a firm in a manner that emulates prices and incentives that the firm might 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6787 
(1990) (replacing traditional regulation with price cap regulation for interstate telephone local 
exchange carriers); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 164 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 324, 345 (Ala. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n 1995) (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation for intrastate tele-
communications services in Alabama); In re New England Tel. & Tel., 162 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR). 
4th 38, 44 (Me. P.U.C. 1995) (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation for 
intrastate telecommunications services in Maine); BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 168 Pub. Util. Rep. 
(PUR) 4th 438, 470 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n. 1996) (transitioning to price cap regulation from tradi-
tional regulation for intrastate telecommunications services in North Carolina); BellSouth, 169 
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 144, 158 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1996) (transitioning to price cap 
regulation from traditional regulation for intrastate telecommunications services in South Caroli-
na); Telephone Regulatory Methods, 157 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 465, 471 (Va. State Corp. 
Comm’n 1994) (transitioning to price cap regulation from traditional regulation for intrastate tele-
communications services in Virginia); Vogt, supra note 130, at 384 (explaining that many state 
regulators adopted some version of a price cap regulation for telecommunications carriers in the 
1980s and 1990s). 
 180 See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 135 (implementing decoupling to achieve 
Massachusetts energy and environmental public policy goals); N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra 
note 135 (implementing decoupling to achieve New York energy and environmental public policy 
goals); PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public safety and climate 
change impacts of lost and unaccounted for gas). 
 181 See PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public safety and 
climate change impacts of lost and unaccounted for gas); Latin, supra note 36, at 34 (comparing 
methane to carbon dioxide). 
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find if it existed in a competitive market.182 Therefore, state public utility 
commissions should adopt the historical averaging approach.183 
B. It’s All Legal, Too: State Commissions Can Limit Lost and Unaccounted 
for Gas Recovery Without Implicating the Takings Clause 
A command and control capped recovery approach is more likely to 
face Constitutional constraints than the capped recovery by historical aver-
aging approach.184 In Duquesne Light Co. and Hope Natural Gas, the Su-
preme Court provided that if a company has a reasonable opportunity to 
earn a reasonable return on invested capital from the total revenue stream, 
the rates set by a commission will not be deemed confiscatory nor violative 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.185 Unlike 
capped recovery by historical averaging that sets the recoverable cost of lost 
and unaccounted for gas based on the company’s historical average quanti-
ty, the command and control capped recovery approach provides a pre-
scribed schedule of decreasing permitted percentages of lost and unac-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See City of Chi., 385 F.2d at 636 (explaining that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the 
type of service that would be provided and similar prices to what a firm would charge if it was 
subject to competition because in competition firms have incentive to reduce costs or face losing 
market share); Sprint Mo, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 161–62 (explaining that the purpose of certain rate 
regulation is to emulate the results of competition where competition cannot exist because in com-
petition firms have incentives to reduce costs or face losing market share); PA. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the public safety and climate change impacts of lost 
and unaccounted for gas). 
 183 See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 135 (requiring that companies file a decou-
pled rate plan with their next rate case filing because of the policy benefits of energy efficiency 
and distributed renewable generation filing even though decoupled rate plans insulate the compa-
ny from revenue losses or gains from increased or decreased sales between rate cases); N.Y. PUB. 
SERV. COMM’N, supra note 135 (directing the electric and gas utilities to file proposals for decou-
pling mechanisms to encourage utility promotion of, and customer participation in, energy effi-
ciency programs because the public benefits from energy efficiency programs, renewable energy, 
and distributed generation could be substantial despite the fact that decoupling mechanisms insu-
late the company from revenue losses or gains from increased or decreased sales between rate 
cases). 
 184 See 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c) (2013) (setting forth a command and control approach); 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (explaining that a rate that is so low to 
be confiscatory is unconstitutional); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 
585 (1942) (explaining that a rate can be so low that it violates the takings clause); W. Ohio Gas 
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 75 (1935) (holding a gas company’s rates set by 
the Ohio PUC to be so low that they were confiscatory and unconstitutional); H.B. 2870, 189th 
Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 2015) (legislative bill proposing a command and control approach); N.Y. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 21, at 6–7 (explaining the total recovery approach). 
 185 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (holding that a state statute regarding electricity rate 
regulation did not violate the takings clause because there was no evidence that it resulted in an 
unconstitutionally low rate); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605–06 
(1944) (holding that a rate order of the Federal Power Commission did not set a rate so low to be 
unreasonable under the Natural Gas Act or unconstitutional). 
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counted for gas that can be recovered from ratepayers, regardless of what 
actual quantity of lost and unaccounted for gas may be a reasonable cost of 
doing business.186 
Similar to the construction costs that were prohibited from recovery in 
Duquesne Light Co., the command and control capped recovery approach 
prohibits the recovery of one element of costs that may be reasonable from 
a utility company’s ratepayers.187 Provided that a commission sets the com-
pany’s total revenue recoverable from customers as high enough to provide 
the company a reasonable ability to recover its cost in addition to a reason-
able return, these provisions should survive Constitutional review because 
they would be limiting revenue above and beyond the Constitutional mini-
mum.188 Unlike capped recovery by historical averaging, however, which 
sets the rate based on actual costs, the command and control capped recov-
ery approach sets arbitrary decreasing lost and unaccounted for gas limita-
tions.189 The bill filed in the Massachusetts Legislature would eventually 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c) (setting forth, by regulation, a schedule of decreasing per-
missible percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas for Pennsylvania gas distribution compa-
nies); H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 2015) (proposing in legislation a schedule of de-
creasing permissible percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas for Massachusetts gas distribu-
tion companies, culminating in zero permitted lost and unaccounted for gas); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. 
SERV., supra note 21, at 6 (describing New York’s capped approach by historical averaging). 
 187 See 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c) (statute limiting recovery of lost and unaccounted for gas 
using command and control approach); Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 303 (citing 66 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 1315 (Supp.1988), which prohibited electric companies from recovering investments in 
unfinished and cancelled nuclear generating stations); H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 
2015) (bill proposing limits on recovery of lost and unaccounted for gas using command and con-
trol approach). In Duquesne Light Co, a Pennsylvania state statute prohibited the state public utili-
ty commission from permitting the electric companies from recovering from customers the costs 
associated with construction or expansion of a generation facility in electric company rate bases 
until the facility was complete, used, and useful. 488 U.S. at 303 (citing 66 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 1315). Companies had spent tens of millions of dollars developing nuclear power plants before 
the development of these plants were cancelled for numerous reasons and the commission had 
determined that, notwithstanding the cancellation, the decision to invest in development was rea-
sonable, suggesting that if not for the statute, these costs would be recoverable in rates. Id. at 302. 
The electric companies challenged the statute as violating the companies’ rights under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. at 308. The companies argued 
that the Court’s jurisprudence regarding confiscatory ratemaking required the Court to review how 
the commission calculated the company’s rate and whether it should have excluded certain costs 
from that calculation. Id. at 313. Reaffirming its decision in Hope Natural Gas, the Court rejected 
the claims, noting that courts should not scrutinize whichever methodology or theory is used to set 
rates provided that the final rate is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 310. 
 188 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (holding that a state statute regarding electricity rate 
regulation did not violate the takings clause because there was no evidence that it resulted in an 
unconstitutionally low final rate of return on equity); Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 602, 606 (ex-
plaining that the methodology for determining a rate is unimportant for the purposes of validity 
under the Natural Gas Act, and if a rate is valid under the Act, it is constitutionally permissible). 
 189 See 52 PA. CODE § 59.111(c) (setting forth, by regulation, a schedule of decreasing per-
missible percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas for Pennsylvania gas distribution compa-
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completely disallow recovery of any lost and unaccounted for gas ex-
pense.190 Completely eliminating or arbitrarily limiting recovery of lost and 
unaccounted for gas costs, may result in rates below that constitutional min-
imum and therefore may be considered confiscatory.191 
Duquesne Light Co. and Hope Natural Gas demonstrate why the Su-
preme Court’s 1935 decision in West Ohio Gas does not pose an issue for 
gas adjustment clauses using a historical averaging approach that fixes the 
quantity of recoverable lost and unaccounted for gas such as in New 
York.192 Under the logic of Hope Natural Gas and Duquesne Light Co., a 
Commission decision to establish a historical averaging recovery approach 
for lost and unaccounted for gas would not likely present a Constitutional 
problem even if, during certain years, a gas company under-recovered its 
lost and unaccounted for gas expense from its customers.193 This would be a 
                                                                                                                           
nies); H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 2015) (proposing in legislation a schedule of de-
creasing permissible percentages of lost and unaccounted for gas for Massachusetts gas distribu-
tion companies, culminating in zero permitted lost and unaccounted for gas); N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. 
SERV., supra note 21, at 6 (describing New York’s capped approach by historical averaging). 
 190 H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 7 (Mass. 2015) (providing the maximum allowable loss in 
year six and afterward as 0.00%). In 2012, Massachusetts gas distribution companies reported 
total lost and unaccounted for gas to the Department of Public Utilities at percentages as high as 
4.55%. ICF INT’L, supra note 5, at 1–5. 
 191 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 307 (explaining that a rate that is too low to be confisca-
tory in unconstitutional); Fed. Power Comm’n, 315 U.S. at 585 (explaining that a rate that is so 
low that it is confiscatory is unconstitutional); W. Ohio Gas, 294 U.S. at 75 (holding that a gas 
company’s rates set by the Ohio Public Utility Commission to be so low that they were confiscato-
ry and unconstitutional). Command and control approaches like those found in the Massachusetts 
bill or Pennsylvania statute, by excluding the recovery of certain cost in a rate, may result in a rate 
providing the company with revenue lower than its reasonable operating costs and return and 
therefore violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 52 PA. 
CODE § 59.111(c) (statute limiting lost and unaccounted for gas arbitrarily using command and 
control approach); Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 307; H.B. 2870, 189th Gen. Court, 6–7 (Mass. 
2015) (bill proposing limits, followed by complete elimination of lost and unaccounted for gas 
recovery). 
 192 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (holding that certain electric company rates are not 
confiscatory because the total rate established provided the firm with sufficient revenue to have an 
opportunity to earn a return); Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (explaining that a commission is 
free to use whichever methodology it chooses to set a sufficient rate); W. Ohio Gas, 294 U.S. at 
67–68, 75 (concluding that Ohio Commission’s finding of seven percent permissible lost and 
unaccounted for gas recovery in gas company rates despite company-reported average at nine 
percent to be denial of procedural due process rights because the Commission lacked evidence on 
the record of mismanagement and further concluding that approved rates were confiscatory). In 
Duquesne Light, the appealing electric companies did not allege that that the total effect of the rate 
order arrived at was unjust or unreasonable because it was confiscatory. 488 U.S. at 310–11. In-
stead, they argued that the Constitution required types of the Pennsylvania ratemaking process, 
determined in that case by state statute prohibiting recovery of the unfinished nuclear plants, to be 
examined one at a time. Id. at 313. The Court reaffirmed Hope and suggested that it’s the impact 
of the rate that counts, not the method that produced it. Id. 
193 See Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 315 (holding that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting elec-
tric companies from recovering millions of dollars in investments in cancelled nuclear plants from 
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constitutionally permissible result because at the time the rate was set, the 
rate was based on the actual historical lost gas costs, a factor over which the 
company has some degree of control, and therefore the set rate provides the 
company with a reasonable opportunity to recover its operating costs and 
earn a fair return on invested capital.194 Provided that the company had an 
opportunity to earn a reasonable return from its total revenue stream, under-
recovery in this one aspect would not likely present a Constitutional confis-
cation claim.195 
CONCLUSION 
Lost and unaccounted for gas presents numerous issues: it costs gas 
consumers millions of dollars, it consists in part of gas leaks that contribute 
to climate change, and it poses public safety concerns. State public utility 
commissions can design natural gas distribution company rates in a manner 
that incentivizes the company to address all of these concerns, as demon-
strated with New York’s historical averaging approach. Commissions 
should design rates in this manner to further the purposes of statutes ensur-
ing just and reasonable gas distribution company rates by ensuring that 
companies have both an incentive to reduce lost and unaccounted for gas 
volumes and the ability to recover reasonable costs with the opportunity to 
earn a reasonable overall return on invested capital. Additionally, Commis-
sions can and should carefully design mechanisms, such as limitations 
based upon actual historical volumes, that are least likely to cause litigation 
regarding Constitutional takings. 
LIAM HOLLAND 
                                                                                                                           
ratepayers did not violate the takings clause); Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 602, 605 (explaining 
that it is not the methodology used but the final return rate that is important to determine whether a 
rate is unconstitutionally confiscatory). 
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